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In the 40 years or so that have elapsed since the first 
postulations by ECLAC and Raúl Prebisch on the 
centre-periphery system, two periods with different 
evolutions are clearly distinguishable: that of the 1950s and 
1960s, which was marked by a rate of economic expansion 
unparalleled since the eighteenth century, and (hat of (he 
following decades (especially from 1973 onwards) -usually 
known as the period of the energy and financial crisis-
which has been characterized by lhe slackening and even 
complete stagnation of world economic development, 
especially in the peripheral countries. 
Both periods have witnessed profound changes, the 
main aspects of which are summed up in the first part of 
this article in line with the original concepts of Prebisch and 
ECLAC: the polarization, margina liza ti on and deteriorating 
terms of trade of the periphery in contrast with the changes 
in production and technology in the centre. In the second 
part of the article, an analysis is made of the changes in the 
periphery's relations with the principal capitalist centre and 
with the Eastern European countries, in the light of the 
evolution undergone by those regions. Finally, some 
comments are made on the unfinished history of the 
centre-periphery system. 
This article is based on the seminal study published by 
Prebisch in 1949, on the research begun in the early 1970s 
in the ECLAC Economic Research and Development 
Division, and on studies by Aníbal Pinto and by the present 
author. The statistical data are taken from official 
publications of the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). 




{.Back where we started, but on an 
even more unequal basis 
Generally speaking, studies on the centre-periphery 
system have confirmed the validity of the 
fundamental theses of Raúl Prebisch and ECLAC on 
the relationship between the terms of trade, the 
polarization and marginalization of the periphery, the 
unequal spread of technology, and the vital need for 
industrialization. The situation of the 1970s, 
characterized by the meteoric rise of the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
considerable improvement in commodity prices, the 
massive inflow of Eurodollars and petrodollars (but 
without tied direct foreign investment or other 
restrictive conditions), all of which led to the 
narrowing of the gap between North and South, was 
followed -especially in Latin America and Africa- by 
the "lost decade" of the 1980s, which brought these 
regions back to their starting point: i.e., the level 
already reached back in 1970. 
Between 1970 and 1981, the terms of trade of the 
periphery rose by a factor of more than 2.5, but they 
then fell back in the 1980s to levels only comparable 
with those of the 1930s Depression. The period of 
booms and oil shocks which interrupted the 
periphery's relentless drift towards marginalization 
for the first time in history was followed by a drastic 
fall in the periphery's share in the world GDP and in 
international exports and investments. This deteriora-
tion attained dramatic levels in Latin America, which 
ceased to enjoy its traditional situation as a net 
importer of capital and instead began to export capital 
to the centre. 
These general pictures conceal an important 
qualitative change in the traditional heterogeneity of 
the periphery: a regressive trend towards greater 
polarization between the nations and social strata 
struggling to keep their heads above water in 
circumstances of extreme poverty and those with 
aspirations to gradual entry into the industrialized 
centre. In 1965, the per capita GDP of the countries 
with a per capita income of up to US$400, which 
represent 55% of the population of the periphery, was 
equivalent to 4.5% of the corresponding GDP of the 
capitalist centre, but by 1985 it had dropped to only 
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2.2%. In contrast, the corresponding figures for the 
main oil-exporting countries (which have only 0.5% 
of the population of the periphery) were 53% in 
1965, 132% in 1980 and 84% in 1985. The steadiest 
equilibrium was attained by the newly-industrialized 
countries of South and Southeast Asia. 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, the "lost 
decade" was reflected in an 8.3% drop in per capita 
GDP, so that the region lost ground compared with 
Asia. Likewise, the region's share in world exports 
fell from 5.5% in 1970 to 3.8% in 1987. 
In view of the fact that in underdeveloped 
countries economic crises have regressive effects on 
national income distribution, it may be concluded that 
in the 1980s there was a worsening of the situations 
of extreme poverty and of polarization of the system, 
both in relation to the centre and within the periphery 
itself. 
2. Marginalization and dependence 
In the peripheral countries, the energy crisis and (after 
1982) the debt crisis had a marked influence on the 
nature of their traditional marginalization and their 
dependence on the centre. The longer-term structural 
changes which had been building up in the centre and 
also in part of the periphery (especially Asia) likewise 
influence the links between the two poles. 
In the mid-1980s, the periphery satisfied less 
than a quarter of the total external demand of the 
centre: that is to say, its degree of marginalization 
was just as great as in 1960 (although its importance 
to the centre had increased during the energy crisis). 
The opposite relationship -that concerning the degree 
of dependence of the periphery's exports on the 
markets of the centre- remained almost three times as 
great (72%) in the 1960s and 1970s, but went down 
markedly in the 1980s: in 1984 over a third of the 
periphery's markets were outside the centre. A similar 
change took place in the periphery's dependence on 
imports of manufactures from the centre, even though 
in 1984 over three-quarters of the periphery's needs 
were satisfied from that source. These changes were 
due to the stronger horizontal links within the 
periphery and its relations with the socialist countries. 
They also reflect the considerable progress made in 
increasing the industrial content of the periphery's 
exports. 
On the financial level, there has been a process of 
transnationalization due to the growing dependence 
of the periphery on the commercial banks of the 
centre, at the expense of official aid and direct foreign 
investment by transnational enterprises. Between the 
early 1960s and the mid-1980s, the importance of the 
commercial banks rose from 6% to 25%, official aid 
dropped from 56% to 40%, and direct foreign 
investment fell from 19% to 11%, all as proportions 
of total financial flows. Moreover, these flows were 
used mainly to refinance and service the "unpayable" 
debt. The share of the periphery in direct foreign 
investment flows fell from 26% in 1981 to 17% in 
1988. In the latter year, Asia took first place, 
absorbing 52% of the total flows to the periphery, 
compared with 37% for Latin America (moreover, 
half the latter figure corresponded to debt conversion, 
so that there was in fact no contribution of fresh 
capital). 
3. The frustrated hopes of the New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) 
The challenge by OPEC and the commodity boom 
in the first five years of the 1970s paved the way for 
important initiatives by the peripheral countries 
which seemed to indicate a strengthening of the 
bargaining power of the exporters of petroleum and 
other commodities vis-à-vis the industrialized centre 
countries. Among these initiatives, which were 
mainly promoted by the Group of 77 in their 
capacity as representatives of the periphery in the 
United Nations system, were: the Declaration and 
Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) (General 
Assembly, 1974); the Conference on International 
Economic Co-operation (Paris, 1975); and the global 
negotiations on international economic co-operation 
for development and the formulation of the 
international development strategies for the 1970s 
and 1980s (General Assembly). 
Within UNCTAD, negotiations took place on 
particular demands by the periphery such as those 
reflected in the Integrated Programme on Com-
modities and the associated Common Fund; the 
agreements on specific commodities, and the 
Compensatory Financing Facility. In addition 
-following the example of OPEC- various 
associations of countries that produced and exported 
certain commodities such as copper, tin, coffee and 
bananas were set up or strengthened. In the case of 
coffee and bananas, efforts were also made in Latin 
America to reduce the oligopolistic power of the 
transnational corporations in the marketing of these 
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goods by establishing multinational enterprises 
formed by the countries of the region themselves 
(PANCAKE and COMUNBANA). 
The failure of the periphery's plans (as 
incorporated in the demands of the NIEO and other 
global or partial programmes) to come to fruition, 
plus the deterioration of the terms of trade with the 
centre, meant that when the debt crisis came the 
periphery's bargaining power was seriously 
weakened. As ECLAC had already foreseen in 1973, 
it had not been possible to achieve any substantial 
turnaround in the relative positions of strength of the 
centre and the periphery. 
There were many reasons for this frustrating 
outcome. On the one hand, the energy crisis and the 
stagnation of the world economy led to a fall in both 
the export volumes and prices of primary 
commodities. On the other hand, and taking a 
longer-term view, it must be remembered that the 
centre's demand for the periphery's commodities is 
always in strict relation with the structural changes 
and technological progress (the "Third Industrial 
Revolution") that have taken place in the 
industrialized countries. 
4. The consequences of the changes 
in production and technology 
in the centre 
Important trends towards changes in production 
patterns are to be observed in the centre. Thus, there 
is a decline in the growth rate of manufacturing, 
favouring in particular the services sector. In the 
United States, for example, the share of services in 
the GDP rose from 41% to 50% between 1974 and 
1986, while there was also a radical change in the 
structure of personal consumption: in 1960 spending 
on food and clothing accounted for 37% of the family 
budget, but by 1987 this had gone down to 26%, 
largely in favour of services. A similar situation is to 
be seen in other industrialized countries. 
Within manufacturing itself, the traditional 
branches (metal products, machinery and equipment 
ment and basic consumer goods) are losing relative 
weight to electrical equipment and especially 
microelectronics. This is due to the greater demand 
not only from military activities and the space race, 
but also to the worldwide development of 
international informatics, telecommunications and 
telematics services. According to OECD data, 
between 1970 and 1985 the relative importance of 
imports based on natural inputs fell from 31% to 
22%, to the benefit of diversified goods in which 
research and development applications predominated. 
Technological changes involving the use of new 
types of materials and energy, miniaturization, 
automation and robotization point in the same 
direction of saving inputs and labour and attaining 
greater efficiency, as do the ever-wider application of 
biotechnology and the changes in the organization 
and linkages of the transnational corporations, 
integrated manufacturing systems, the "just in time" 
(JIT) principle, etc. 
The trends displayed by the new style of 
development of the centre, further strengthened by 
its technological reaction to the energy crisis, usually 
have two main consequences for the periphery. 
Firstly, in real terms they further intensify its 
marginalization from the centre, thus increasing the 
latter's relative advantage as regards spearhead 
technologies, based on the intensive use of human 
knowledge, which are gradually driving out the 
technologies that make intensive use of labour, 
natural resources, energy and capital. In other words, 
there is a further worsening of the unequal spread of 
technological progress and the dependence of the 
periphery on the transnational corporations of the 
centre, which are the leading actors in these changes. 
Secondly, the new style of development of the 
centre has important repercussions on its own 
interests and its global and individual policies 
towards the periphery. The industrialized countries 
not only consider the New International Economic 
Order promoted by the commodity-exporting 
countries using cheap labour to be dead and buried 
but are also putting forward new demands and new 
international policies concerning the expansion of the 
transnational trade in services, their export, and the 
right of foreign direct investments to enjoy the same 
treatment as national investments on the markets of 
the recipient countries; the provision of effective 
protection for the intellectual property of trans-
national corporations; and the replacement of the 
Code of Conduct on the latter through the gradual 
elimination of the Trade-Related Investment 
Measures (TRIM). According to the industrialized 
countries -especially the United States, judging from 
its statements in the Uruguay Round of GATT- these 
are the main government measures (applied by the 
countries that receive direct foreign investment and 
investment by branches of transnational corporations) 
which affect the centre's trade and financial freedom. 
20 CEPAL REVIEW No. 42 /December 1990 
The countries of the periphery, of course, naturally 
defend their right to regulate the inflow of foreign 
investment in accordance with their own needs and 
to develop their own spearhead technology, as in the 
case of the pharmaceutical, computer and informatics 
industries in Brazil. 
The above hypotheses seem to be confirmed in 
the international trade in foodstuffs. As the 
agricultural production of the centre has not yet been 
incorporated in the new style of technological 
development and the periphery still enjoys in most 
cases the advantages of its environment and its 
relatively cheaper labour, the governments of the 
industrialized countries are obliged to protect the 
interests of their farmers (who still form an important 
social and electoral group). According to UNCTAD 
data, over the last 10 years the five most important 
markets (United States, European Economic 
Community, Japan, Australia and Canada) have 
considerably raised their subsidies to their producers 
of milk, sugar, wheat, rice and maize. In 1987-1988 
the United States and the EEC gave an annual 
average of US$25 billion in support to their farmers: 
that is to say, much more than in the 1982-1985 
period (US$15 billion). In 1980-1983 Japan spent an 
average of US$13 billion per year for the same 
purpose. In order to get an idea of the importance of 
the centre's protectionist practices in agriculture, it 
is only necessary to note that in 1984 the periphery's 
exports of foodstuffe to these three areas totalled 
some US$32 billion, while the direct subsidies were 
also supplemented with tariff and other barriers 
(import quotas, plant health rules, etc.). 
5. The industrialization of the periphery and 
Latin America's lag in this respect 
The faster growth rate of manufacturing on the 
periphery compared with the centre has meant that 
between 1965 and 1985 the former increased its share 
in world manufacturing production (from 15% to 
18%) and especially in exports (from 7% to 18%). 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
display a relative lag in this respect, however, 
compared with other regions and especially the 
newly-industrialized countries of South and Southeast 
Asia. If the degree of industrialization is measured as 
the share of manufactures in the total GDP, the 
stagnation of the region's industrialization process is 
to be noted not only during the economic and 
financial crisis of the 1980s but also in the longer 
term. 
In the 1960s the degree of industrialization of 
Latin America and the Caribbean increased from 21% 
to 23%, rising still further to 24% in 1980, only to 
drop back to its 1970 level in 1983. In contrast, the 
industrialization of South and Southeast Asia was 
steady and unbroken: it rose from 14% in 1960 to 
16% in 1970 and 21% in 1980, and was still at that 
level in 1983. In the latter year, the share of manu-
factures in the external sales of the main exporters of 
such goods -among which the only Latin American 
country was Brazil- reached a level of 27%. 
The lag is even greater with regard to the 
periphery's share in the markets for manufactures. 
Between 1970 and 1984 these products more than 
doubled their share in the total exports of the 
periphery to the industrialized countries (from 14% to 
30%), considerably exceeding the share of primary 
commodities other than fuels (22% in 1984). 
Apparently, the dynamism of the periphery's 
performance in the international economy will always 
be determined by the degree of industrialization of its 
economies and of its trade. During the period in 
question, however, the share of manufactures in the 
total exports of South and Southeast Asia rose from 
44% to 63%, whereas the corresponding proportions 
for Latin America and the Caribbean were 7% and 
19%, respectively. Over the same period, the 
presence of the Asian subregion on the markets for 
manufactures in the centre trebled from 3% to 10%, 
thus matching the levels of the industrialized 
countries of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), whose manufactures represented 64% of 
their total exports in 1984 and supplied 9% of the 
world market. The relative lag of Latin America 
(19%) and the Caribbean (2%) is therefore a basic 
issue in the regional debate on the need to change 
production patterns and raise the international 
competitiveness of Latin American exports. 
6. Preliminary conclusions 
The rise and fall of OPEC and other commodity 
producers' associations would seem to indicate that 
when the historical downward trend in the terms of 
trade between commodities and manufactures 
(including services) was reversed thanks to the 
unilateral raising of the prices of some commodities, 
this did not automatically bring about the more 
balanced spread of technological progress or reduce 
the marginalization and state of dependence of the 
periphery. 
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This state of dependence and the financial 
exactions involved in the export of capital to the 
centre through the transnational banks were more 
salient factors than the commercial exactions due to 
the unfavourable terms of trade. It was therefore 
vitally necessary to reappraise both the role of the 
productive transnational enterprises and that of 
governmental financial assistance from the centre 
(even through its international organizations) with a 
view to reducing the burden of the "unpayable" debt. 
The strategy of the Latin American governments 
and ECLAC for the 1990s, which seeks to achieve 
changing production patterns with social equity, 
reflects the experience accumulated in the deeper 
analysis of Prebisch's original postulations that 
industrialization is essential if the periphery is to 
improve its position on world markets, where it is 
currently at the mercy of the demand for primary 
X, The capitalist centres 
While the regressive differentiation of the periphery 
continues, the correlation of economic forces in the 
capitalist centre moves towards greater equilibrium. 
Regardless of the ups and downs of the short-term 
situation, such as the past energy crises, the current 
financial crisis and the impact of "Reaganomics", in 
the long term a single clear tendency prevails: the 
economic hegemony of the principal centre (the 
United States) is weakening compared with the 
emerging powers in Europe (Germany) and Asia 
(Japan). At the same time, the new centres and the 
former principal centre are locked in a mutual 
struggle and are forming regional blocs of countries 
with common characteristics and interests. Without 
going any further into the complex history and causes 
of this process (which are analysed in this same issue 
of CEPAL Review by Celso Furtado), we will simply 
outline its longer-term projections in the cases of the 
United States, West Germany and Japan, especially 
insofar as they affect the periphery. Over the period 
1950-1987, Japan's average economic growth rate 
was more than double that of the United States (7.1% 
and 3.2%, respectively), so that it jumped from ninth 
to fourth place in the world GDP table, moving ahead 
of West Germany, which had moved up from sixth to 
commodities, the role of which in economic growth is 
shrinking at an everincreasing rate because of the 
present technological revolution. 
Finally, the new endogenous and integral nature 
of technological progress -especially in electronics 
and informatics- also calls for a reformulation of the 
original thesis of a passive role for the periphery in 
the propagation and spread of such progress. In order 
to modernize and attain greater international 
competitiveness, the economies of the periphery must 
take active steps to gain possession of advanced 
technology (as occurred in Japan and other Asian 
countries and in Brazil). This can be achieved 
through the application of suitable State policies and, 
above all, the mobilization and stimulation of the 
economic and social agents by assuring them greater 
equity in the distribution of the fruits of progress. 
fifth place. In 1987, the per capita GDP of Japan and 
West Germany was nearly US$10 000 -only a third 
less than that of the United States. In the same year, 
the first exporter in the world was West Germany, 
with the United States second and Japan third. 
Germany and Japan were also ahead of the United 
States in improvement of labour productivity, 
propensity to save and invest, and world financial 
position (West Germany and Japan were the world's 
leading creditor countries, while the United States 
was the principal debtor). The relative decline of the 
former principal centre also extended to its direct 
foreign investment: in 1986 it invested US$26 billion 
less abroad than the year before, but it absorbed 41% 
of the total world flow of direct foreign investment: 
i.e., half the total for the whole of the industrialized 
countries. 
For 25 years (1960-1985) there was a trend 
towards the marginalization of the periphery from the 
markets of all the industrialized centres except Japan. 
The periphery suffered worse marginalization in the 
United States market than in Europe, but its share of 
the Japanese market increased. Between 1970 and 
1985, the share of Latin America and the Caribbean 
in the United States market went down from 15% to 
12%, and their share in the African market fell from 
4% to 2%, but their share in Asia rose from 9% to 
II 
The centres and their links with the periphery 
22 CEPAL REVIEW No. 42 /December 1990 
17%. The strengthening of the links between the 
United States and the newly-industrialized countries 
of Asia led to the disappearance of the latter's 
traditional preference for Latin America, however. 
In the markets of the Western European trade 
groupings (EEC and EFTA), the share of the 
periphery also suffered a decline, with these 
groupings maintaining their traditional preference for 
the Asian and African countries, which, in 1985, 
accounted for three-quarters of their imports from the 
periphery. In that year, Latin America's share in the 
EEC market was only a quarter of its level of trade 
with the United States, while in the case of EFTA it 
was only one-sixth. The delinking between Europe 
and Latin America was clearly reflected in the EEC's 
exports to the region, which went down by 38% 
between 1981 and 1985 (compared with drops of 
20% and 11% for the exports of the United States 
and Japan). In 1985 Europe's trade deficit with the 
region was US$12 billion. This imbalance confirms 
the ECLAC theory: in order to pay the debt and at the 
same time increase imports from the centres it is 
essential to lighten the debt burden and achieve 
greater openness (less protectionism) of the markets 
of the centres. In the case of the EEC, the most 
important issues are the preferential treatment 
(discriminatory against our region) granted to the 64 
ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries under 
the Lomé Convention and the subsidies and 
protectionism involved in the Common Agricultural 
Policy. 
The manifestly growing importance of the 
Japanese market for the periphery is due largely to its 
continued dependence on oil imports and the 
emergence of a new integrated centre for the Pacific 
nations. Between 1985 and 1987, for example, the 
exports by South Korea and Taiwan to the Japanese 
market increased from US$7.5 billion to US$15.2 
billion: i.e., they doubled in three years. The links 
with the Japanese transnational enterprises and banks 
that (together with the similar United States firms) 
make possible the access of the newly-industrialized 
Asian countries to spearhead technologies and trade 
in highly sophisticated goods are also growing. Japan 
is becoming the new centre of a subregion 
characterized by very dynamic growth and rapid 
change in the fields of production and technology. 
Africa and Latin America have always been 
more marginalized from the Japanese market. In 
contrast with this marginalization (a 4% share in 
1985), however, there has been the larger financial 
investment directed to the region. Whereas the flow 
of direct foreign investment from the United States 
went down, the average annual flows from Japan 
increased by a factor of over 2.5 between 1976-1980 
and 1981-1984: much more than those directed to the 
industrialized nations or the other developing regions. 
The role of Latin America in the direct foreign 
investment and also in the loans of the Japanese 
transnational banks suggests that that country could 
help to solve the debt crisis in the future by promoting 
changes and modernization in Latin America's 
production and increasing the region's exports. 
2. The Eastern European member countries of 
the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) 
In order to understand the profound economic and 
social changes that have taken place in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to bear in 
mind their structural crisis. The concentration of 
resources on extensive industrialization enabled these 
countries to attain higher growth rates than the 
centre-periphery capitalist system during the period of 
expansion of the world economy. Centralized 
planning and management ran into a crisis situation in 
the late 1960s, however, in the relatively more highly 
developed economies of the German Democratic 
Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and later Poland. 
These countries most clearly reflected the common 
problems of lagging technology and low labour 
productivity associated with a voluntaristic economic 
approach and isolation from the capitalist markets. 
The period of peaceful coexistence of the 1970s, 
with its greater openness for economic and cultural 
exchanges, showed that the military and geopolitical 
balance between the socialist and capitalist blocs was 
not matched in the economic sphere, and especially in 
its spearhead sectors (except in areas directly related 
to the military competition between the two 
superpowers). 
These domestic factors were compounded by the 
effects of the energy crisis and the world economic 
recession, which slowed the growth of the socialist 
countries and reduced their capacity to compete with 
the capitalist system. According to UNCTAD 
estimates, between 1975 and 1982 those countries' 
share in world GDP went down from 12% to 9%, 
while their share of world trade fell from 11% in 
1960 to only 8% in 1987. 
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The loss of dynamism and international 
competitiveness of the CMEA countries may be 
illustrated with some indicators of the economic 
competition between the Soviet Union and the United 
States. In the 1960s, the Soviet Union was catching 
up on its big lag behind the United States in terms of 
national income and manufacturing product, since the 
gaps of 42% and 45% which had existed in 1960 had 
been reduced to 35% and 25% by 1970. Fifteen years 
later, in 1985, however, the corresponding lags were 
34% and 20%: i.e., only a little less than in 1970. 
Moreover, in 1985 the lag was even greater in per 
capita terms: 43% in the case of national income and 
31% in manufacturing product (all these data are 
taken from official USSR statistics). 
The USSR's lag was even more marked as 
regards the structure and efficiency of its production. 
According to the same official statistics, in 1960 the 
labour productivity in Soviet manufacturing was 56% 
less than in the United States, and although by 1970 
the gap narrowed to 47%, in 1985 it was almost as 
great as ever: 45%. 
The stagnation of the international com-
petitiveness of the countries practising "true 
socialism" is connected with the semi-peripheral 
nature of their participation in the world economy. To 
begin with, they concentrate on trade within the 
CMEA, and this tendency was further strengthened in 
the 1980s when the Soviet Union's comparative 
advantages as an oil exporter were reduced (the 
weight of intra-CMEA trade in the bloc's transactions 
went up from 51% at the beginning of the decade to 
58% in 1987). Such cohesion within the CMEA was 
due more to the centralized political system than to 
the comparative advantages of its participants. The 
principal centre of the system, the Soviet Union, 
mainly supplied its partners with petroleum, gas and 
other primary commodities in return for their 
manufactures. Its fellow-CMEA countries, for their 
part, needed Western technology to modernize their 
economies, and because of the shortage of hard 
currency, aggravated by the energy crisis, they ran up 
heavy debts with the countries of the capitalist centre. 
The most flagrant case of this was Poland, which, like 
Mexico, suffered a veritable financial collapse in 
1980 when the external debt service commitments 
exceeded the payments capacity of exports. 
Secondly, the links of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe with the industrialized countries are 
also of a peripheral nature. In 1987, only 21.5% of the 
CMEA countries' total exports went to the 
industrialized countries, and they represented only 
2.5% of the latter's imports (6.4% for EFTA, 3.2% 
for the EEC and 0.5% for the United States). This 
marginalization is largely due to the prevailing type 
of trade: in the mid-1980s fuels and other primary 
commodities accounted for a bigger share of the 
CMEA countries' exports than those of the periphery 
(78% as against 70%), while although manufactures 
predominated in the CMEA's imports (57%) an 
increasing proportion of the latter consisted of 
foodstuffs (because of the Soviet Union's grain 
deficit). 
Thirdly, trade with the countries of the periphery 
had less importance for the CMEA countries than for 
the capitalist centre (12% for the latter but only 5% 
for the former in 1987). Moreover, the predominantly 
political criteria of the CMEA countries caused them 
to prefer to trade with the socialist countries (Cuba 
and some Asian countries), which accounted for 
over a third of this trade, with the discrimination 
being even more marked in the case of official 
financial assistance, about two-thirds of which went 
to the latter-named countries. In the sectoral 
composition of the CMEA's mutual trade, fuels and 
other primary commodities predominated, with 
manufactures playing a bigger role in the group's 
exports than in its imports. Latin America's exports 
satisfied only 4% of the total demand of the CMEA 
countries, and even then this trade was mainly 
limited to Cuba and Argentina (sugar and grains). 
3. The horizontal linkages of the periphery 
The continual marginalization of the periphery from 
the markets of the centre has been accompanied in 
recent decades by an increase in the importance of 
horizontal links within the former: i.e., an increase in 
mutual trade in goods within the peripheral area. In 
this aspect too, however, the Latin American region 
has lagged behind. Thus, intra-regional trade went 
down from a peak of 19% in 1980 to only 14% in 
1987, when the degree of regional integration was 
27% for the periphery as a whole (excluding the 
OPEC countries) and as much as 61% for the 
European Economic Community. 
The effects of the debt crisis and the political 
situation in Central America were not favourable to 
economic co-operation in the region. Fortunately, the 
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democratization process in the Southern Cone has 
involved the establishment of major programmes of 
sectoral integration and business co-operation 
between Argentina and Brazil and, more recently, 
Uruguay too, and there are prospects for the 
expansion and deepening of this process to include 
Francis Fukuyama recently said that with the collapse 
of true socialism in Eastern Europe the history of 
mankind has come to an end: in other words, 
omnipresent capitalism is entering upon a period of 
everlasting peace. The development of the 
centre-periphery system since that term was coined 
by Prebisch and ECLAC in 1949 -i.e., its evolution 
over four decades since the end of the war- shows 
that this is a biased and voluntaristic view, however. 
Our generation -young hopefuls when the war ended 
but now advanced in years- has gone through various 
failures and seen the frustration of its forecasts of 
both triumph and disaster. Let us recall, for example, 
the pride and ambitions of the young African 
nations freed from the colonial yoke, only to be 
followed by tribal wars and mass famine; our joy at 
the exploits of OPEC in 1973, with the prospect of an 
unlimited flow of petrodollars; the adoption by the 
United Nations General Assembly of the New 
international Economic Order, the International 
Development Strategies for the 1970s and 1980s, the 
UNCTAD programmes, etc., only to culminate in the 
present lost decade for the region, and more recently 
the buoyantly hopeful programmes of the post-
dictatorship governments in Brazil, Argentina and 
Peru, contrasting with the present economic and 
social chaos in those countries. 
With regard to disasters, the author would like to 
make just one personal and self-critical comment 
which is totally contrary to the position taken by 
Fukuyama: the whole generation of Czechoslovak 
Stalinists and, after the Russian occupation in 1968, 
reformists, revisionists and "traitors to the cause" 
lived and strove to further their views under two false 
slogans, which, it may be noted, were shared by most 
of the European and Latin American left. The first of 
other countries such as Chile. As this first phase 
involves relatively industrialized countries, it may 
be assumed that this economic integration process 
will advance faster than previous initiatives and 
that it will further the transformation and 
modernization of the economies in question. 
these was the need to write "finis" to the history of 
world capitalism in the present phase of its general 
crisis heightened by neo-imperialism, global 
transnationalization, the struggle between rich classes 
and nations and their exploited and dominated 
counterparts, and so forth. According to Stalin, 
Khrushchev, etc., the five-year plans of the Party 
and the State would make it possible to catch up with 
and overtake the decadent imperialist economies 
-especially that of the United States- and attain 
world socialist revolution, based on Leninist/Soviet, 
Maoist Chinese or Castroite Cuban models. 
The second disaster theory -that of the local 
opponents of the communist governments, shared 
by distinguished Kremlinologists and Western 
statesmen- was that it is not possible to attain from 
within or by peaceful means any thorough-going or 
systematic change in an Eastern Europe dominated by 
the administrative and military apparatus of a 
superpower permeated with the Brezhnev doctrine. 
The result which we now all know so well is the 
perestroika of Gorbachev and the bloodless 
revolutions of Eastern Europe (setting aside, of 
course, the terror unleashed by the tyranny of 
Ceaucescu and, in Asia, the Tianamen massacre). 
The fate suffered by the triumph- or 
disaster-oriented approaches shows that the history of 
mankind and of the centre-periphery system has not 
come to an end, as Fukuyama claims, with some 
specific events, even though these may decisively 
influence the course of a particular period in history. 
On the contrary, we believe -in line with the views of 
our great friend and mentor Aníbal Pinto- that the 
greatest challenge for analysts is the fact that the 
history of the centre/periphery system is not yet 
complete. The same is true of the thinking of Raúl 
III 
The unfinished history of the system, 
and some queries for the 1990s 
THE PRESENT MORPHOLOGY OF THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY SYSTEM / J. Kñakal 25 
Prebisch and his perhaps over-modest band of 
disciples. Francis Fukuyama's forecast implicitly 
includes the thesis -shared by many public figures 
and intellectuals not only of the Centre but also of 
Latin America- that the validity of the centre-
periphery approach is now a thing of the past for all 
of us and that we now universally and definitively 
accept the neo-liberal approach, albeit subject to 
some of its many qualifications. The work done by 
ECLAC in recent years, and especially the common 
governmental programme adopted in Caracas on 
change and modernization with social equity, 
however, also gives the lie to this view, which claims 
the triumph of the so-called "Chicago boys" and the 
rout of those of us from ECLAC who are cast in 
the Prebisch mould 
Moreover, it stands to reason that a substantial 
group of distinguished personalities did not meet in 
Caracas earlier this year simply to pay a nostalgic 
tribute to Raúl Prebisch, nor to justify his proposals 
with one of the many works of the Master, along 
the lines of the selective utilization of the dogmas of 
Karl Marx the younger or the elder, but came together 
rather in order to develop the unfinished thinking of 
the ECLAC of Prebisch's days, in an open and 
innovative discussion. 
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Among the questions that we might raise with 
regard to the situation at the end of the century are the 
following: 
— Will the new situations as regards world 
production, trade and finance lead to the 
heightening of inter-capitalist competition and 
the emergence of a new principal centre, or will 
they result rather in a better regulated or 
co-ordinated multipolar balance? 
— What will the system be like without the 
principal centres? 
— What links will it have with the ongoing 
military hegemony of the two superpowers? 
— What effects will be exerted on the periphery by, 
firstly, the profound geopolitical changes 
involved in the creation of a European Common 
Market including a unified Germany and the 
subsequent successive entry into that market of 
the Eastern European countries; secondly, by the 
integration or formation of blocs between the 
United States, Mexico and eventually other 
countries of the region under the Bush initiative; 
and finally the process of integration in South 
and Southeast Asia under the aegis of Japan? 
Decidedly, the history of the centre-periphery 
system is still far from finished. 
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